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GOD IS NOT THE AUTHOR OF SIN:
AN ANSELMIAN RESPONSE TO MCCANN
Katherin A. Rogers
Following Anselm of Canterbury I argue against Hugh McCann's claim that 
a traditional, classical theist understanding of God's relationship to creation 
entails that God is the cause of our choices, including our choice to sin. I ex­
plain Anselm's thesis that God causes all that has ontological status, yet does 
not cause sin. Then I show that McCann's God, if not a sinner, must nonethe­
less be an unloving deceiver, McCann's theodicy fails on its own terms, his 
proposed requirements for moral authenticity are insufficient, and his sug­
gestion that his universe is "safer" than Anselm's is misguided.
Hugh McCann asks a pressing question in the title to a recent article, "[Is 
God] The Author of Sin?" His answer is, yes! He argues that on a tradi­
tional understanding of divine sovereignty we must suppose that God's 
creative activity causes our existence complete with our choices. He writes 
that, "God [is] the author of sin in one sense: namely, that he is the First 
Cause, as tradition would say, of those acts of will in which we sin. All of 
our willings owe their existence immediately to God, just as we do, and 
could never take place but for his active participation, in the form of will­
ing that they occur."1 His proof is that we cannot make sense of the idea 
that, though God is the cause of everything with ontological status, we 
ourselves and not God cause the existence of our choices. (His thesis is that 
both we ourselves and God cause our sin, but in different orders of being.) 
He goes on to argue that, though God is the author of sin, He is not sinful 
Himself. McCann grants that his position conflicts with the traditional free 
will defense, since he explicitly denies the claim that all the wickedness 
and consequential suffering originates ultimately with creatures and not 
with God. But he proposes an alternative suggestion for why a good God 
would allow, and in fact produce, all the wickedness and suffering of the 
actual world. He concludes by arguing that his view does not undermine 
our claim to authenticity as moral agents.
In this paper I argue first, following Anselm of Canterbury, that it is 
possible to analyze choice in a way which allows that all that has being 
comes from God without that making Him the author of sin. I go on to 
show that, although on McCann's understanding of "sin" he may succeed 
in showing that his God is not a "sinner," he needs to address the further 
charges that his God is an unloving deceiver. I argue that his proposed 
theodicy fails even on its own terms and that moral authenticity requires 
more than his analysis allows. I conclude with some thoughts on our de­
sire for "safety."
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Anselm on Created Agency
McCann, quite rightly in my view, subscribes to what might be called a 
traditional understanding of classical theism which sees God as the ab­
solute, immediately sustaining source of all that is not Himself. Many 
contemporary philosophers of religion seem to assume a much more di­
minutive divinity. For example, some seem to suppose a god who set 
things in motion "in the beginning," and who knows what's going on 
and perhaps interferes with the universe periodically, but does not keep 
everything in being from moment to moment. Others (Molinists for in­
stance) propose something like Plato's demiurge who is confronted by 
a set of independently existing propositions which function as a frame­
work constraining his creation. But if one insists upon the traditional con­
cept of divine omnipotence and sovereignty, one faces a difficult task in 
carving out a place for created agency. McCann, following Augustine and 
Aquinas, settles for what I term "secondary" agency, on the model of sec­
ondary causation in general. In speaking of natural causes, it is correct to 
say that some natural event, the burning of the fire for example, is a real 
cause of some natural effect, like the reducing the cotton to ash, though 
the entire system, all the objects and properties and events, are imme­
diately willed and caused by God (the distinction between willing and 
causing is quoad nos since willing and causing are one to God). God is the 
primary cause and the fire is the secondary cause. So with human agency, 
according to McCann. It is correct to say that you cause your choice, but 
you, and everything about you, all your properties and actions, are im­
mediately caused by God. The problem, of course, is that then God is the 
author of sin.
McCann's basic defense of the position that a creature can have only 
secondary agency is that, given traditional, classical theism it makes no 
sense to suppose that the creature can cause the actual existence of any­
thing at all. Further, McCann argues that positing that the created agent 
causes a choice must lead to a vicious regress. In order to bring the choice 
into being, it would have to engage in a previously chosen activity, which 
choice would have to be preceded by yet another, etc.2 One way to attack 
this latter claim might be to note that McCann himself posits at least one 
agent, God, who brings choices into being presumably without any vi­
cious regress, and so such a thing is not impossible simpliciter. And if it is 
possible for some agent to create a choice, and God is omnipotent, ought 
He not to be able to create an agent who can create a choice? Perhaps not. 
God cannot create all possible beings. For example, it is possible for some 
being, God, to exist as uncreated, but He obviously cannot create an un­
created being. So maybe it is just not possible for God to impart his sort of 
truly independent, creative agency to creatures.
But maybe it is possible for Him to impart a dim reflection of divine 
aseity. I propose to argue that created agents can indeed choose from 
themselves, such that their choices are not produced by God, even though 
God is the source of all that has being. The proposal here is based on the work 
of Anselm of Canterbury in his efforts to deal with issues very similar 
to those raised by McCann. Anselm's analysis is extremely complex and 
sophisticated, and I will not begin to do it justice here.3 I think I can say
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enough, though, to cast doubt on McCann's claim that primary, created 
agency is just impossible. Anselm's thesis is this: absolutely everything 
that is not God is from God. That means that all the existents involved 
in a human choice are immediately, causally sustained by God. Anselm 
sees these existents as the faculty of the will itself, and the desires which 
result in a choice. In the case of rational agents, God creates in us two sorts 
of desires. There is the desire for "benefit," that is, whatever we believe 
will make us happy. All things with wills, including lower animals, desire 
benefits, and no one is motivated except by a desire for benefit. However, 
God creates in rational agents a second order desire for what he terms 
"justice."4 In desiring justice we desire that our desire for benefit should 
be properly ordered in accord with the will of God. Sometimes we may 
find ourselves wanting something that we believe will make us happy, 
but which we hold to be outside of what we justly ought to desire. In such 
a situation the desire for justice comes in conflict with the desire for (this 
particular) benefit. Sin consists in pursuing the benefit contrary to justice. 
And it is entirely up to the created agent whether he clings to the justice or 
throws it away by willing the benefit.5
Does this mean that there is some thing, the choice, which is not made 
by God? Well, there are things and things. There is an aspect of the event 
of you choosing sin over justice, or justice over sin, which is entirely up 
to you. But this aspect, though decisive, is nothing with ontological sta­
tus. What a choice consists in is simply a desire reaching its conclusion, 
and the desire is given by God. In the case of conflicting desires Anselm 
suggests something very similar to the hypothesis of plural parallel pro­
cessing which Robert Kane proposes in an effort to solve libertarianism's 
"intelligibility problem."6 To make the point clear, first suppose an agent 
has only one, god-given desire and follows it to its conclusion—e.g., God 
makes you and He creates in you a desire to eat which you follow to the 
point where you eat. Nothing in this scenario suggests any limitation 
on divine sovereignty or omnipotence. Absolutely everything is caused 
by God. But the situation is not so different with conflicting, god-given 
desires. You are trying to succeed, not at pursuing a single desire, but 
rather at pursuing two different desires both of which cannot be real­
ized. Whichever desire eventually "wins out," it came from God. Every 
thing in the choice is caused by God. You did not bring anything new 
into being, any more than if you had had but a single god-given desire 
to follow.
But if you had had only one desire to follow, you, the created agent, 
would not have any input in the choice at all. You would, like the lower 
animal, simply be doing what God made you to do, like the good dog 
or horse which wills as it ought to will because it cannot choose other­
wise. Human beings are more impressive in that they can step back from 
their immediate desires, and choose that those desires should accord with 
the will of God. It is this ability which gives the created agent a measure 
of aseity, a reflection, however minute and dim, of God's independence.7 
Granted, this ability to choose rightly does not confer much independence 
on the creature, nor does it confer any real creative power at all. In a good 
choice, every thing in the choice, and all its properties including its good­
ness come from God. In a sinful choice, every thing comes from God, and
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the only property which can be credited to the created agent is the sinful­
ness, which isn't any sort of a thing at all, being only the absence of the 
justice that ought to have been there.8 Still, it is up to the created agent 
alone whether it will cling to justice or throw it away.
Anselm does not ignore or try to soft-pedal the intellectual discomfort 
involved in his libertarian analysis of created freedom. The existence of 
conflicting desires can be attributed to God's causal activity. The "winning 
out" of one desire over another cannot be explained in terms of anything 
at all, beyond the bare fact of the agent's success in following the "win­
ning" desire. Robert Kane holds that so long as the agent succeeds in his 
intended goal he is responsible, even if success at a conflicting goal was 
equally possible. But still, if the question is, what ultimately explains the 
preference of one option over another, there is no answer, and Anselm 
seems less sanguine about this conclusion than Kane. Anselm ends his 
discussion of this issue, what would today be termed the "intelligibility 
problem," by saying that a free choice, "[is] its own efficient cause and ef­
fect, if such a thing can be said."9
Anselm recognizes that his conclusion involves having to accept some 
unintelligibility when it comes to created agency. And it involves saying 
that the decisive aspect of the choice, what is really up to the choosing 
creature, is not any sort of thing at all. Perhaps these conclusions are prob­
lematic. But what other options do we have? If McCann is right, we can 
allow that God is author of sin, or give up on the God of the tradition 
altogether. I turn now to McCann's argument that tracing sin back to God 
as its cause is not such a bad move after all.
God an Unloving Deceiver
McCann argues, rightly it seems to me, that his view that God causes us 
with our sin does not make God a sinner. McCann's analogy of the au­
thor to the literary creation is telling here. Shakespeare causes Hamlet to 
stab Polonius, but Shakespeare does not stab Polonius. Hamlet wickedly 
commits a murder (surely he did not really believe it was "a rat" behind 
the arras!), for which he is responsible. Shakespeare is responsible for the 
entire situation in all its details, but he is not wicked and responsible for a 
murder. God may cause us sinning, without Himself being a sinner.
But can McCann's God escape the charge of being a deceiver and unlov­
ing? McCann analyzes sin as the deliberate choice to act against the com­
mand of God. God cannot be a sinner because He is not in authority over 
Himself and does not give Himself commands. Note that McCann, unlike 
Anselm, does not see human virtue as reflective of the will or nature of 
God. Anselm sees sin as deliberately choosing against the will of God, and 
God inevitably wills that all creatures should flourish by actualizing their 
natures, becoming the most perfect and fully realized instances of what 
they are. In this way each creature pursues its own "truth" thus imitat­
ing God's nature as the absolute standard for Perfect Truth.10 This is what 
enables us to give content to the attribution of goodness to God. We have 
some grasp of the goodness of the divine nature through understanding 
its reflection in the metaphysical and moral goodness of creatures.11 This 
move from created goodness to divine goodness is closed for McCann
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who apparently sees virtue as consisting in deliberately choosing to fol­
low God's commands, which commands do not follow from the divine 
will or nature. God commands created agents to do one thing and then 
wills that they do the opposite.
So on a general level, it is hard to see how McCann will unpack the 
claim that God is good in some recognizable sense. And it is very hard to 
see how McCann will defend the ascription to God of the standard divine 
virtues of being truthful and loving. McCann must certainly grant that 
God causes deception. Traditionally ignorance is held to be a result of sin, 
and so on the Anselmian account, God is not the author of deceit. But 
McCann must hold that insofar as any created believer is deceived, God 
made them in their mistake. This is uncomfortable in that it rules out the 
long and distinguished tradition, from Plato to Plantinga, of positing God 
as the guarantor of knowledge, connecting the knower to the known. Per­
haps McCann will argue that being the author of deception does not make 
God a deceiver, just as being the author of sin, does not make God a sinner. 
Othello is deceived, but it would be strange to say that Shakespeare, and 
not Iago, had deceived him.
But what about those divine commands? In explaining the point about 
how God is not in authority over Himself and so cannot disobey His com­
mands and be a sinner, McCann gives the analogy of the father's command 
to the son to be home by midnight. Although the industrious philosopher 
might be able to devise exotic counter examples over which we need not 
tarry, as a rule a sincere command entailing obligation on the part of the 
commandee must intend to instill in him two beliefs. It must instill the 
belief that the commander wants to be obeyed. Suppose the father has 
insisted that the son spend the night at his cousin's house, a thing the son 
is loath to do, and then jokingly commands him to be home by midnight. 
The son is under no obligation to be home by midnight because he knows 
it is not really what his father wants. Further, the command must intend 
to instill the belief that it is possible for it to be obeyed. This is because 
presumably it cannot be the case that you ought to do something which it 
is not possible for you to do. A serious command demanding obedience 
would entail that both the commander and the commandee believe that 
the commandee can obey. If father and son both know that, given the son's 
location and the laws of physics, he cannot be home by midnight, it would 
be irrational of the father to seriously issue the command, and the son 
could not be obligated to obey it. When someone issues a command, then, 
the tacit entailments are that he wants to be obeyed and he believes it is 
possible that he can be obeyed. It follows that, on McCann's account, when 
God commands He deliberately deceives in that He knowingly conveys 
that He wants to be obeyed and He believes it is possible that He should 
be obeyed, when in fact, in the cases where He causes sin, He does not 
really want to be obeyed and He knows it is not possible for the sinner to 
have obeyed in any case.
The case for McCann's God being unloving is even more straightfor­
ward. If you love someone you desire their good. God, on McCann's view, 
creates sinning agents whom He will eternally damn for their sins. Per­
haps, as the Augustinian tradition holds, it is better to exist in eternal 
damnation than not to exist at all, and so Hell is better than nothing. In an
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Anselmian universe in which God leaves creatures free to sin, this point 
would explain why God does not permit the sinful to simply destroy 
themselves utterly and blink out of being. But it would be perverse to 
insist that eternal damnation is the good of the creature that love would 
desire. If McCann does not want to embrace universalism he is committed 
to God's wanting and causing terrible, permanent harm to at least some 
of his creatures.
McCann's Alternative Theodicy
Can it be argued that, though God is the author of sin, and hence deceit­
ful and unloving, He is nonetheless good? Perhaps His deceiving most 
of his created agents—those who do not accept that God is the author of 
sin—and causing permanent harm to some is necessary for a good which 
outweighs the overall harm and suffering and which cannot be acheived 
by any better means. McCann writes that God's moral injunctions are 
probably "what he would have preferred in the abstract, apart from the 
particular considerations that lead him to will finally that we engage in 
acts that are sinful."12 But this is a strange claim if the aim of McCann's 
theory is to defend the absoluteness of divine sovereignty. How can "par­
ticular considerations" interfere with what God otherwise prefers? God is 
the immediate cause of all that is not Himself. Either He can achieve His 
goals without having to cause sin or He cannot. A sovereign God would 
not need to act so repugnantly in order to bring about the good He envi­
sions. But a God who caused sin when it was not necessary for a greater 
good, would not be good.
McCann argues, to the contrary, that the sin is indeed necessary. The 
point of our existence as created agents is that we might freely choose 
committment to God.
But . . . a responsible choice in God's favor requires that we under­
stand the alternative—which is to be at enmity with him. Guilt, re­
morse, a sense of defilement, and the hopeless desolation of being cut 
off from God cannot be understood in the abstract, because if they 
are only understood abstractly they are not ours. Only through ex­
perience can we understand what it means to be in rebellion against 
God, and we gain that experience by sinning.13
McCann's explanation here makes some sense in an Anselmian uni­
verse. God might permit sin, knowing that it might contribute to the good 
of our understanding what it means for us to cut ourselves off from God. 
(Though note that insisting that God foresees some good coming from 
the evil is not at all the same thing as saying that God prefers that the evil 
should occur.) And in Anselm's universe, since God does not cause decep­
tion and the choice to reject God really must come only from ourselves, 
the first-hand experience is not to be had without the sin. But McCann's 
universe is different. God is the immediate cause of everything about us, 
including all of our understandings. There is no room for any original 
contribution from the side of the creature. If we have an understanding 
of guilt, etc., it is because God causes in us the belief, the feeling, and
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whatever else belongs to our understanding of guilt, just as He causes 
the sin which is the source of the guilt. But then McCann's claim that 
only through the experience of sin can we have this understanding can be 
shown to be false for several reasons.
First, God is a rational creator. He understands what He makes. He 
cannot make in us the understanding of guilt, etc., without having the 
understanding Himself. He cannot create in us the understanding of guilt 
as our own without having that understanding. But God does not Himself 
sin. Thus the understanding of guilt, etc. does not require the experience 
of having sinned. In McCann's universe we are not at a sufficient distance 
from God that we can see things from our own perspective which He does 
not share. We cannot have beliefs and feelings and experiences which He 
does not cause and which He does not understand exactly as we under­
stand them. If we allow enough created autonomy to enable us to have a 
perspective which is not reducible to ideas caused in us by God then we 
have departed from McCann's position and have no reason to embrace the 
claim that God causes sin.
So it is possible for someone, God at least, to understand guilt etc. with­
out having sinned. One might suggest that creatures need to undergo the 
experience of sin in order to have the understanding. But why? If God can 
make the belief in us, the secondary causes involved in our actually hav­
ing sinned are not necessary. For example, God could, having created in 
us a choice to sin, to abuse a child, let's say, then create in us a very vivid, 
but false, experience that we are carrying through with the sinful deed, 
though in fact we are not. Or perhaps He could create us on the doorstep 
of heaven with a life-time's worth of false memories of having sinned, 
done the sinful deed, and ultimately repented. Presumably the under­
standing of what it is to be cut off from God would follow just as surely, 
but no children would have to suffer. If the good goal to be acheived by 
the sin is the understanding, and the understanding is created in us im­
mediately by God, then the sinful deed with all the consequent harm and 
suffering is unnecessary, and a memory of having sinned might do every 
bit as well as actually having sinned.14
Can McCann argue that this option of deception is not open to God 
since a good God does not deceive? No. As we have seen, McCann's God 
deceives when He issues commands which, at least in the case of many 
towards whom they are directed, He does not really want to have obeyed, 
and which He knows it is impossible to obey. And in any case, if creating 
us sinning does not entail that God sins, creating us deceived does not en­
tail that God is a deceiver. Certainly people are in fact very often deceived. 
For the Anselmian, all that has ontological status in the mistaken belief is 
made and sustained by God, but the mistake itself can be attributed to our 
fallenness, and hence deception originates with the created agent. For Mc­
Cann, we do not ultimately contribute anything of which God is not the 
immediate cause, and so any instance of deception is caused by God. So 
McCann cannot argue that God would not create in us false beliefs regard­
ing our sins and sinful deeds. But then a theodicy which holds that God 
must cause actual sin, and sinful deeds, and the terrible consequences we 
see in the world, because He needs all of this horror to produce our under­
standing of guilt etc.does not do the job.
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The Requirements of Moral Agency
McCann argues, in the final section of his paper, that his view allows the 
created agent sufficient moral autonomy. He sees two criteria for agency, 
first, a feeling of spontaneity, "that we do, rather than undergo" and sec­
ond, intentionality. Both of these features are "fully compatible with God's 
role as First Cause of our acts of will." And they are "all that is needed to 
make me a morally authentic being."15 The Anselmian agrees with the first 
claim, but that means he must disagree with the second. In fact, though 
McCann claims to subscribe to the libertarian view of freedom, his conclu­
sions here fit well with compatibilism.16 Take Anselm's example of some­
one who has only a single, god-given desire. In choosing in accordance 
with his only desire he fullfills McCann's two criteria. He rightly feels that 
he is an actor who has done something, and not just a passive receiver who 
has undergone something. And he understands and means to be mak­
ing his choice. It is intentional. Compatibilists standardly offer this sort 
of example as exhibiting fully-determined free choice. Anselm insists it 
is not free in the relevant sense. In this situation the rational agent is like 
the horse or the dog in that he can do only what he is created by God to 
do. The created free agent needs genuinely open options—a requirement 
which McCann does not discuss, but one which is almost always held to 
be the sine qua non of a libertarian analysis of freedom. If we cannot choose 
other than God creates us choosing, how can we bear any ultimate respon­
sibility for our choices? On Anselm's analysis the reason the created agent 
needs open options is so that he can make a choice which is genuinely from  
himself. Perhaps McCann can claim for created agents a sort of "second­
ary" autonomy, but in that God is the ultimate author of their choices this 
sort of "autonomy" does not capture what libertarians see as requisite for 
moral responsibility.
A Dangerous Universe
McCann is right that this Anselmian position concludes to what many will 
see as difficult consequences. We must grant that "our deeds and judg­
ments . . . lead the course of providence, so that God must somehow ad­
just his behavior to ours, or work around us to achieve his ends."17 But 
on Anselm's account, this limitation is imposed by God on Himself when 
He chooses to create free agents who will have some share in His aseity. 
On McCann's analysis God is even more limited. He needs sin to achieve 
His goals. And presumably this need is not something He has chosen for 
Himself. If He could achieve His goals without the sin, but chooses sin as 
the means, His goodness is called into question.
If it is argued that, on Anselm's account, it could turn out that no one 
is saved, I find that a logical entailment of the system, but not a serious 
concern. Given God's omnipotence, through which He can produce as 
many created agents as He wants and continue to work good for them, it 
seems so statistically remote as to be uninteresting. But just for the sake 
of argument allow the worst case scenario in which every human being 
does freely reject saving grace. Then, if it were really the best, God could 
step in and turn us into the kind of beings McCann already believes us to
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be. God could create (McCann style) good willings in us, so that heaven is 
properly populated. But in this case He would be the author only of a sort 
of good, not of sin. The Anselmian is not really happy with this solution, 
since it trades on the suggestion that God might radically diminish our 
metaphysical stature as agents and by creating a "secondary" goodness 
in us, make us incapable of genuine moral responsibility, all of which the 
Anselmian sees as a harm to us. But McCann himself cannot direct this 
criticism against the proposal, since in his view our having this diminu­
tive metaphysical stature and only secondary goodness is completely con­
sistent with God's goodness.
McCann concludes his paper with the observation that if we could pos­
sess what I label primary agency our decisions would not "become more 
spontaneous, or our intentions more sincere. . . . The only change would 
be that our wills would finally be out of God's reach—just as Adam and 
Eve wished they could be. And then we could never rest fully in God's 
providence, and so could never be safe."18 Here we come to what may be 
a deep-seated and powerful motivation to abandon the Anselmian view. If 
we are primary agents free to reject God then each of us must daily face the 
real fear that we might just up and choose to turn our back on Him. At any 
time we might just choose to cut ourselves off from our one chance at last­
ing happiness. It seems to me that this is a genuine fear and an important 
issue for libertarian theists. It deserves more consideration than I can give 
it here, but let me perhaps start the discussion by making two observa­
tions. First, Anselm himself argues that it is possible for the created agent 
to arrive at a point where he need no longer fear that he will reject God. We 
are motivated only to choose what we believe will make us happy. If, on 
our own, we have chosen justice, eventually we can arrive at a stage where 
we see nothing to desire which falls outside of the will of God. This is the 
condition of the good angels (and presumably, the saints) now. By their 
own efforts they have placed themselves beyond the possibility of sinful 
desire.19 They no longer have moral options, nonetheless they are free be­
cause it is "from themselves" that they have arrived at this point. So it is 
possible, on the Anselmian account, to reach safe haven eventually.
But for us still walking through the dark valley, the fear cannot be dis­
missed. Anselm holds that it is possible for us, even having received the 
grace requisite for salvation, to reject it. God does not ask much of us. 
He does not expect us to, per impossibile, generate some goodness out of 
ourselves. All we need do is to hang on to what He has given us. But we 
might fail at even that minimal task. If we have experienced the joy and 
comfort of faithful belief, we may judge that it would be madness and 
near impossible for us to abandon it. But, at least for most of us, we may 
feel that constancy is not an absolute certainty. This side of the grave we 
are not 100 percent safe.
But is not the same true on McCann's view? You may today be the 
most virtuous person and feel assured of heaven, and tomorrow God 
may rewrite your character as one fallen from grace, sinning and eternally 
damned. Perhaps you can "rest" and feel "safe" in that, whatever hap­
pens, it is exactly what God wants to have happen, but this will not be 
much comfort to you if you are finally and completely cut off from God. 
Even worse. From the Anselmian perspective God is the absolute source
AN ANSELMIAN RESPONSE TO MCCANN 309
and standard of all truth and all charity. Hatred and deception are a fall­
ing away from God. If it should turn out that He is instead an unloving 
deceiver, then the world is turned upside down and there is no safety any­
where, ever. It is not clear that a universe of atoms and the void is worse 
than the "safety" of such a God. The Anselmian position involves two 
costs: our choices are not perfectly intelligible, and God's omnipotence is 
limited by His own choosing. This seems a small price to pay for the assur­
ance that God is not, after all, the author of sin.
University of Delaware
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Studies 41 (2005) pp. 249-68.
5. This is why Anselm argues, in On the Fall of the Devil 14, that a (hypo­
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cord with what God wants, could not really will justly. Like a dog or a horse, 
the angel "received [the desire to will rightly] in such a way that he is un­
able to will otherwise." But, as Anselm uses the term, "justice" for the created 
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Will and Indeterminism," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999) pp. 217-40.
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cussion which lies beyond the scope of this paper. But for a striking text on 
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given created agents the conflicting desires of (mere) benefit and justice, "so 
that [created agents] can, in a way, give justice to themselves. Indeed, if they 
could not remove it from themselves, there would be no way they could give 
it to themselves."
8. See Anselm's On the Fall o f the Devil 9 and On the Harmony of the Fore­
knowledge, and the Predestination, and the Grace o f God with Free Choice 1.7.
9. On the Fall o f the Devil 27. Translation is my own.
10. That sin is choice against the will of God is made clear in On the Free­
dom of the Will 8. The point that all creatures have a sort of "rightness" of which 
God's nature and will are the standard comes through most clearly in the last 
two chapters of On Truth.
11. One proof text for this point is Anselm's response to Gaunilo (section 
8). The latter had criticized the Proslogion argument by insisting that we can­
not have any concept of "that than which no greater can be conceived."
12. McCann (2005) p. 151.
13. Ibid. p. 153.
14. This suggestion fits well with McCann's own occasionalist leanings. 
See "The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism" (with Jonathan
Kvanvig) Philosophical Perspectives 5 ed. J. E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, CA: Rid- 
geview Publishing, 1991) pp. 587-615.
15. McCann (2005) pp. 156-57.
16. McCann's approach echoes that of Augustine, who is clearly a com- 
patibilist. See my “Augustine's Compatibilism" Religious Studies 40 (2004) pp. 
415-35.
17. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo is an effort to show how the fall made the 
Incarnation “necessary"—necessary in the sense that God, being the best, in­
evitably does the best.
18. McCann (2005) p. 158.
19. On the Fall o f the Devil chap. 25.
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